

8 January 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR :

SUBJECT : 5 January CIA Memorandum entitled "European Defense Cooperation, MBFR, and the Soviets"

The 5 January memo cited above was an interesting document and, to me, an enlightening one. It did, however, generate some questions as I read it. These are outlined below, and I would like to discuss them with you. Such discussion, of course, can be oral and I am not expecting any written response to this informal note.

1. Re the memo's paragraph 1, when it speaks of "the goals of MBFR negotiations" whose goals is it talking about? Those of the U.S. delegation or those of the Europeans?

2. I do not understand the parenthetical comment at the end of paragraph 2.

25X1

3. I am not entirely clear, in connection with the memo's third paragraph, just how MBFR agreements might prejudice the already decided development of a European Community into a European Union". Is this indeed a valid concern and, if so, is it shared by all of the nine or just by some? If it is not a valid concern, what real issues are being masked by this smoke screen?

4. In the same set of tic marks (the 3rd), how could a future European Union "take over the implementation and verification of possible agreements"? Would such a union have satellites, armies, reconnaissance airplanes?

5. On the first tic mark after "in particular", am I correct in thinking that what is really being talked about here is the "subceiling" problem? From the language of the memo I would infer that the EC participants would accept an overall ceiling on NATO theater forces

-2-


but would reject any partial limitations restricting the size of of the forces of any given country. Is this accurate?

6. I also do not quite understand "the foreign force" problem in the third tic mark. Presumably, the BAOR would be part of the overall European ceiling. Hence, how does the "foreign force" question arise?

7. For my information, what are the French actually doing to sandbag the creation of an effective European defense organization or, more precisely, what is it they have refused to do which inhibits progress in these directions?

8. I am not quite sure how "an eventual defense organization" is a "natural consequence of the European unity movement", unless you are talking about some form of regional force contributed by member countries but under Brussels' control. Is this indeed what is contemplated?

9. What is it that is really bothering the Soviets? Are they truly disturbed about the prospect of a unified European defense organization, or are they more concerned about West Germany and its assuming a predominant or eventually controlling role in any West European military alliance? Perhaps both. Could the Russians in a sense be viewing Western Europe somewhat as the British viewed it throughout the better part of the 18th and 19th centuries, especially the latter - i. e., with the determination to prevent any single power from becoming militarily predominant in Europe? From the perspective of Whitehall, such an underlying determination contributed greatly to England's opposition to France in the first part of the 19th century and her emergent opposition to Germany in the latter part of the century and in the first part of the 20th century after Bismarck achieved German unification. I am curious whether the current view from the Kremlin is analogous to the view from Whitehall which shaped British policy for more than a century.



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